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Abstract 
Although gardens are typically appreciated as peaceful spaces of apolitical 
serenity, this article highlights how gardens can provide new sites and 
sensibilities that complicate our understanding of diplomacy, war and peace. 
While gardens are a popular location for diplomatic performances—for example, 
the Treaty of Versailles—the global politics of gardens remains under-
researched in International Relations (IR). To address this gap, the article 
follows the “aesthetic turn” in IR to examine gardens as contingent social 
constructions of social-ordering and world-ordering which both shape and 
participate in global politics. In particular, it develops a framework to examine 
how peace-war becomes intelligible in gardens through contingent conceptual 
dynamics such as “civility/martiality.” It then employs the framework to explore 
how two key national memorial sites—the Nanjing Massacre Memorial in China 
and the Yasukuni Shrine in Japan—work as gardens to creatively perform civility 
and martiality in unexpected ways. Such an oblique intervention underlines how 
war memorials, gardens and other odd IR sites are not stable containers of 
meaning, but need to be actively (re)interpreted as performances of cultural 
governance and resistance. Garden-building here is theory-building: by 
producing new sites and sensibilities of global politics, it creatively shapes our 
understanding of IR.  
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On December 26, 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the 
Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo to commemorate his country’s war dead. A few days 
later Liu Xiaoming (2014), China’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, 
denounced Abe’s visit in London’s Daily Telegraph: 
In the Harry Potter story, the dark wizard Voldemort dies hard 
because the seven horcruxes, which contain parts of his soul, 
have been destroyed. If militarism is like the haunting Voldemort 
of Japan, the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo is a kind of horcrux, 
representing the darkest parts of that nation’s soul. Last week, in 
flagrant disregard of the feelings of his Asian neighbors, Shinzo 
Abe, the Japanese prime minister, paid homage at the Yasukuni 
Shrine … 
Liu here is voicing a reasonable concern that Abe is remilitarizing Japan; indeed, 
the Yasukuni Shrine is a controversial site because it enshrines the souls of 
thousands of war criminals. China and South Korea are particularly critical when 
Japan’s leaders visit the Shrine because they are still mourning the atrocities 
committed by imperial Japan. 
Discussions of the Yasukuni Shrine thus characteristically frame it as an 
issue of “Japanese nationalism,” “East Asian International Relations (IR),” and/or 
the problems of “history and memory” (see Kingston 2007; Takenaka 2015). 
Ambassador Liu’s intervention is interesting because it points in new directions. 
Certainly, his invocation of Harry Potter follows the trend in IR that values 
popular culture as an innovative approach to global politics (see Neumann and 
Nexon 2006). Importantly for this article, Liu’s criticism of Abe’s visit to the 
Yasukuni Shine also highlights gardens as sites of global politics: the Shrine is 
not simply a memorial, it is also a garden park (see Mashima 2008). While 
“peace gardens” as a site for relaxation are now common in everyday urban life 
(see McClimens, Doel, Ibbotson, Partridge, Muscroft and Lockwood 2012), how 
can we understand the global politics of gardens which actively celebrate war? 
This article thus follows the Chinese ambassador’s lead to explore how gardens 
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can be “unexpected places” for the global politics of diplomacy, peace and war 
in a general sense (see Sylvester 2008; Lisle 2016; Guillaume et al. 2015), and 
how the Yasukuni Shrine in particular demands to be interpreted as a peace/war 
garden. 
Although gardens are a popular location for diplomatic performances—
the Treaty of Versailles, for example—analysis of the global politics of gardens 
itself is under-researched in IR. Serious analysis is generally located in the 
humanities and professional schools: art history, social history and landscape 
architecture (see Barmé 1996, 2008; Clunas 1996; Jay 2011; Kuitert 2012, 2017; 
Henderson 2013; Wang 2014). Among social scientists, geographers and 
sociologists have devoted the most attention to the topic, using gardens to 
interrogate relations of space, nature, culture and power (see Bauman 1987, 
1989; Yoon 1994; Mukerji 1997, 2012; Luke 2000; Burrell and Dale 2002; 
McClimens et al. 2012). This article builds on these interdisciplinary trends, 
especially as they combine in international social history/international historical 
sociology (see Go and Lawson 2017). The aim is to examine how gardens—like 
battlefields (see Guillaume et al. 2015, 2)—are contingent social constructions 
which shape and participate in global politics. Gardens here are a site, an 
institution, an enactment, and an encounter. In addition to analyzing gardens as 
sites of symbolic power, the article also appreciates them as a material modality 
where diplomacy, war and peace are represented, performed, and experienced 
through more embodied, affective and everyday encounters (Butler 1990; Enloe 
2011; Lisle 2016, 22). The aim of the article, then, is to highlight how peace/war 
becomes intelligible, and thus is enacted or appropriated, in part through garden 
performances.  
To develop a framework for exploring the global politics of gardens, the 
article first locates its analysis in four interrelated theoretical contexts: Rancière’s 
“distribution of the sensible,” Foucault’s “heterotopia,” and the hybrid concept 
“civility/martiality,” in order to understand gardens as a dynamic performance of 
cultural governance and resistance. The following two sections use examples 
from Japan, China and France to further develop this analytical framework, 
which is then applied to explore how two key national memorial spaces—the 
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Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo and the Nanjing Massacre Memorial in China—act as 
gardens which embody different experiences of cultural governance and 
resistance. The conclusion argues that we can use this analytical framework to 
raise questions about other key national memorial spaces, such as the National 
September 11 Museum and Memorial in New York. The analysis thus advances 
critical IR in two ways: it uses gardens to explore how global politics emerge 
through complex performances of social-ordering and world-ordering, and it 
employs non-Western (here East Asian) concepts and examples to explore 
global politics both beyond and within Euro-America. 
 
Aesthetic Global Politics 
 
The discussion of the global politics of gardens is located in the “aesthetic turn” 
of international studies (see Bleiker 2009; Shapiro 2013). It argues that the 
issues of diplomacy, war and peace can be profitably explored through an 
assemblage of conceptual dynamics: utopia/dystopia/heterotopia, 
(re)distribution of the sensible, cultural governance/resistance and civil/military.  
 It is common to see gardens as a utopian space: a peaceful place, a 
blissful island of apolitical serenity, where people engage in contemplation, play, 
and sensuous enjoyment. In both Persian and Greek, “Paradise” comes from 
the word for a walled garden (Burrell and Dale 2002; McClimens et al. 2012,124-
125, Henderson 2013, xi, 6). Interestingly, in his discussion of utopia and 
heterotopia, Foucault points directly to gardens. Utopian spaces, according to 
Foucault (1986, 24), are “fundamentally unreal spaces … sites with no real 
place.” Heterotopia, however, can be radical because it is “capable of 
juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in 
themselves incompatible” (Foucault 1986, 25). Heterotopia is a hybrid place 
where multiple spaces are simultaneously represented, contested, and inverted. 
Foucault’s examples of heterotopia are colonies, brothels, prisons, cemeteries, 
ships—and gardens. Here, heterotopia is involved in projects of social-ordering 
and world-ordering. Indeed, Foucault (1986, 26) is particularly fascinated by the 
garden as heterotopia because it “is the smallest parcel of the world and then it 
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is the totality of the world. … [it is] a sort of happy, universalizing heterotopia.” 
Botanical gardens, for example, are a heterotopic mix of incompatible plants 
which juxtapose incommensurable ecosytems: alpine plants in lowland London, 
and desert plants in rain-forest Singapore (see Luke 2000). Heterotopia, then, is 
an interesting concept because it liberates us from the search for singular 
meaning, and encourages us to understand space aesthetically in terms of 
multiple, overlapping and contingent dynamics, such as 
utopia/dystopia/heterotopia (see Rancière 2004, 40-41).  
When we speak of “aesthetics” in global politics, we are not discussing a 
theory of beauty, but are more concerned with styles of ordering that raise ethical 
questions (Hall and Ames 1998; Rancière 2004, 2009; Bleiker 2009; Shapiro 
2013). Rancière (2004,10) argues that we need to understand aesthetics as a 
“specific regime for identifying and reflecting on the arts: a mode of articulation 
between ways of doing and making, their corresponding forms of visibility, and 
possible ways of thinking about their relationships.” Aesthetics is thus a specific 
“distribution of the sensible”: “the delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible 
and the invisible, of speech and noise, that simultaneously determines the place 
and the stakes of politics as a form of experience” (Rancière 2004, 13). Politics, 
then, is not found in the struggle for power, but in the configuration of space that 
frames social-ordering and world-ordering. Politics thus takes shape either in 
“policing” the hegemonic distribution of the sensible, or challenging it through 
dissensus, a redistribution of the sensible that “disrupt[s] the relationship 
between the visible, the sayable, and the thinkable” (Rancière 2004, 63). 
Politico-aesthetics here is very active, a heterotopic performance that takes in 
all senses of material experience (Butler 1990; Rancière 2004, 40-41; Lisle 
2016, 21).  
As heavily-designed spaces that forge particular relations between the 
visible, hearable, smellable, and feelable (Kuitert 2002), gardens are exemplary 
distributions of the sensible. Still, the politics of such material modalities is often 
overlooked, even in critical IR, because of their indirect impact on global politics; 
this article, however, argues that gardens can shape global politics in a broader 
way as sites of political performances that set the parameters for what can (and 
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cannot) be seen, said, thought and done (Rancière 2004). 
To chart out the ethical workings of such aesthetic global politics, the 
dynamic of cultural governance and resistance is useful (Shapiro 2004). For 
example, rather than taking the “nation” for granted as an actor in a rational 
calculus, Shapiro sees the nation as a set of unstable social relations that take 
on coherence through cultural governance. This cultural governance looks to 
Foucault’s (1991) understanding of power as a productive force that is generated 
by contingent social relationships, rather than as a set of juridical practices that 
restrict action. Shapiro (2004, 34) argues that while for the early-modern state, 
sovereignty relied on “military and fiscal initiatives,” by the nineteenth century 
these “coercive and economic aspects of control have been supplemented by a 
progressively intense cultural governance … aimed at making territorial and 
national/cultural boundaries coextensive.” But Shapiro (2004, 49) does not 
simply chart out the productive power of state-led cultural governance; his critical 
approach also shows how resistance can emerge through other modalities of 
expression—films, journals, diaries, novels, and counter-historical narratives—
that “challenge the state’s coherence-producing writing performances.” Cultural 
governance here is analogous to Rancière’s policing of the distribution of the 
sensible, and resistance emerges through dissensus, a redistribution of the 
sensible (see Shapiro 2013, xv, 30-31). 
Lastly, this section considers how the peace/war distinction is informed 
by the civil/military dynamic. As Ambassador Liu’s article shows, the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) regularly presents itself as a “peaceful civilization”—
especially in relation to what it sees as the “remilitarization” of Japan. Tokyo 
likewise proudly points to postwar Japan’s “Peace Constitution,” and worries 
about China’s growing military capability. But “militarism” refers to more than the 
accumulation of military hardware; as Shaw (2013, 20) explains, it is better 
understood as “the penetration of social relations in general by military relations.” 
Indeed, while the common liberal narrative of social progress sees society 
civilizing the military, often the interaction results in the militarization of society 
(Huntington 1957, 466; Virilio 1986, 62).  
I would like to expand this consideration of civil/military relations to see 
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how civil and military can work together aesthetically in the distribution of the 
sensible in war/peace gardens. IR theory’s standard view of “civil” and “military” 
figures them as separate and distinct camps “pitched in opposition to each other” 
in a struggle for power (Huntington 1957, 80-86; Feaver 2011, 90). To see how 
civil and military work aesthetically in war/peace gardens it is helpful to examine 
how the civil/military distinction takes shape in another political space: imperial 
China’s wen/wu dynamic. Wen generally means “literary,” “civilian” and 
“civilization,” while wu generally means “physical,” “military” and “martial” (Louie 
2002, 10). The two concepts certainly can be understood as opposites; but not 
necessarily in the sense of the mutually exclusive binary opposition of “either 
civil or military.” Wen/wu does not necessarily contrast the roles of different 
autonomous actors, such as the soldier and the civilian (Huntington 1957; 
Feaver 2011). Likewise, wen/wu does not map easily onto gendered distinctions: 
that is, feminine-civil and masculine-martial (Louie 2002, 9-11). Rather, the ideal 
person in pre-modern China, Japan and Korea harmonized a dynamic balance 
of civility and martiality, as both a poet and a warrior. World-ordering, national 
governance, family relations, and personal self-cultivation, all were guided by 
this quest to harmonize the complementary opposites of literary and martial 
performances (Louie 2002, 11, 15-17; Benesch 2011, 133-137).  
 The main point here is not the (neo)Orientalist one that East Asia provides 
an “exotic” alternative, fundamentally different from “Western civilization.” 
Following current trends in comparative political theory (see Jenco 2015), this 
article resists the geopolitical container-style organization of knowledge-
production where the choice is between the “modern West” and “traditional 
China.” Rather than replacing “Eurocentric” concepts and experiences with 
“Sinocentric” ones, the article explores how discussions of civil/military relations 
in different social and historical spaces can generate theoretical consensus and 
dissensus.  
Here, the argument is that civil/military is much more than a categorical 
distinction or a struggle between the autonomous camps of civilians and 
soldiers. It builds on critical IR’s critique of the binary oppositions that 
characterize Enlightenment thought and disciplinary IR (see Walker 1993; 
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Shapiro 2013), to see civility/martiality as a contingent conceptual dynamic. This 
dynamic governs the performances of social-ordering and world-ordering in 
ways that can provide a more nuanced understanding of questions of diplomacy, 
war and peace. The point is not simply to sort national identities as “peaceful” or 
“militarist,” but to see how each new event (national day parade, treaty signing, 
military battle—and garden experience) needs to be evaluated in terms of how 
it performs the civility/martiality dynamic. Indeed, what is most interesting about 
this dynamic is its lack of a stable canonic definition: there is no orthodoxy, and 
its contingent flexibility demands that we make sense of civil/military relations 
through continual interpretive practice (see Louie 2002; Benesch 2011, 165).  
As this section has argued, these four conceptual dynamics share a 
common aesthetic approach that helps us to highlight how global politics takes 
shape through social relations, sensibility, experience and performativity. These 
contingent dynamics resonate with each other in complex ways as an 
assemblage that offers no stable account of causality. For the sake of this 
article’s analysis of the global politics of gardens, they constitute a framework 
for examining how gardens can act as exemplary sites where the 
civility/martiality dynamic takes shape as a heterotopic experience of particular 
(re)distributions of the sensible. Such (re)distributions of the sensible, in turn, 
generate cultural governance and resistance. 
 
Gardens as Political and Diplomatic Spaces 
 
The Yasukuni Shrine and the Nanjing Massacre Memorial are not isolated 
examples of gardens as sites of global politics. Since the turn of the twentieth 
century, gardens have been an important part of public diplomacy for both China 
and Japan. Their goal was to use gardens as a mode of cultural governance to 
present their countries to the West as “civilized” and “peaceful” nations worthy 
of international respect—and thus not targets of military intervention. One of the 
first Japanese gardens built abroad was commissioned by Tokyo as Japan’s 
official national pavilion at the Chicago World’s Fair in 1893. This Japanese stroll 
garden was very popular: it worked to present Japan as an exotic, civilized 
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country that was not a threat. In 1910, the British and Japanese governments 
organized the Japan-British Exhibition in London to celebrate the two countries’ 
new military alliance; it also was designed to convince the British public that 
Japan was not a backward country. In addition to showing Japan’s modern 
manufactures, the exhibit displayed a traditional Japanese garden, “The Garden 
of Peace” (Mochizuki 1910).  
 After World War II, one of the ways that the US and Japan pursued 
reconciliation was through gardens. The Japanese embassy in Washington DC 
includes the Ippakutei tea house garden, which is open to the public each Spring. 
Ippakutei, which means “Century Tea House,” was built in 1960 to 
commemorate a century of US-Japan relations. Many cities in the US have a 
Japanese garden park, often accomplished though sister-city diplomacy 
(Hamilton 1996, 89-90). Indeed, the Japanese pavilion in Chicago was rebuilt in 
the 1960s with donations from the Japanese city of Osaka, and is now called the 
Osaka Garden. Likewise, the Portland Japanese Garden in Oregon (dedicated 
in 1963, opened in 1967) was part of a prominent move toward reconciliation 
and cultural exchange at the local level (Hamilton 1996, 1, 89-93). As Portland’s 
mayor explained in 1962: “This Garden will provide the citizens of Portland with 
an area of great beauty and serenity and at the same time represent a warm, 
understandable link to Japan” (cited in Hamilton 1996, 91).  
Chinese gardens are also popular around the world, and are likewise part 
of diplomatic reconciliation (see McDowall 2016). After the US and China 
normalized diplomatic relations in 1979, the first cultural exchange project was 
to build a Chinese garden for the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York 
(Murck and Fong 1980-81, 61). This garden-building was part of Beijing’s 
general re-engagement with the world that started in 1978 with Deng Xiaoping’s 
reform and opening policy. Indeed, by 1998 over thirty-five Chinese gardens had 
been built in fourteen countries (Wang 1998, 61; McDowall 2016). As its plan to 
build a $100 million Chinese garden in Washington’s US National Arboretum 
shows, Beijing continues to see gardens as a suitable investment for influence 
abroad (Higgins 2017). Japan and China have thus recruited gardens into their 
public diplomacy strategies as examples of state-led cultural governance. As in 
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many hegemonic distributions of the sensible, gardens employ seemingly 
apolitical activities for very political aims. The success of this strategy can be 
seen at the UNESCO world headquarters in Paris where global humanity’s 
“Garden of Peace” is a Japanese garden (UNESCO n.d.).  
Strangely, both China’s and Japan’s public diplomacy strategies involve 
an odd recycling of Orientalist discourse that is now deployed by Asian states, 
rather than by the Euro-American metropole (see Clunas 1996; McDowall 2016). 
But such diplomatic gardens are not merely directed at foreign audiences; as we 
will see in the next section, state-sponsored gardens are a site of cultural 
governance (and resistance) for both domestic and foreign policy performances.  
 
Gardens as Sites of Social-Ordering and World-Ordering 
 
Louis XIV (r. 1643-1715) was known to have an overwhelming passion for two 
things: building and war. The result of both passions is the world’s most famous 
imperial garden at the Palace of Versailles. With its geometrical design, 
Versailles is the best example of French formal gardens embodying the 
Enlightenment values of order, rationality and logic. As Mukerji (1997, 2012) 
explains, Versailles was not simply a pleasure garden, but rather a site of cultural 
governance. French formal gardens functioned as “social laboratories,” where 
economic power was translated into political power (Mukerji 1997, 32). The 
garden at Versailles was thus France-writ-small, a virtual world where the 
French monarch’s control over the garden embodied the French state’s control 
over nature—and its control over society (Mukerji 1997, 2012; Hall and Ames 
1998, 181; Thomas 2009, 119). The geometric patterns at Versailles were not 
simply aesthetically pleasing, but served to integrate diverse elements—in the 
garden and in French society—to reflect the hierarchies of the new centralized 
state (Yoon 1994; Mukerji 1997, 9; Thomas 2009). As such, it is an example of 
Rancière’s politico-aesthetics: Versailles’s new relation of the visible, the 
sayable, and the thinkable, asserted a redistribution of the sensible suitable for 
imperial France. 
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Here, Louis XIV was engaging in what Bauman calls the “gardening 
impulse,” which is not just about gardens, but entails broader notions of 
governance. While in pre-modern Europe the ruling class functioned as “game-
keepers” to keep peasants off their estates, by the early modern period the ruling 
class worked as “gardeners” to regulate the environment and society (Bauman 
1987, 52). Bauman (1989, 70) thus argues that the gardening impulse works to 
violently set “apart useful elements destined to live and thrive, from harmful and 
morbid ones, which ought to be exterminated” (emphasis in original). This 
scientific view of social ordering informs the modern administrative state, which 
Bauman (1989, 13) calls the “gardening state,” to apply the violent logic of the 
gardening impulse to sort humanity into useful elements to be nurtured, and 
harmful ones to be exterminated (also see Luke 2000; Barmé 2008; Jay 2011).  
 The violence was not merely metaphorical. Versailles’ baroque landscape 
was constructed by military engineers to reflect the Sun King’s martial values: 
the garden’s battlement-style walls supported the king’s hierarchal view of 
society (Mukerji 1997, 15, 39ff; Jay 2011, 50). Louis XIV thus integrated civility 
and martiality in a redistribution of the sensible that built France as a modern 
administrative “gardening state.”  
Versailles’s cultural governance also worked through garden itineraries 
written by Louis XIV himself: nobles, the bourgeoisie, and even peasants were 
invited to perform the garden by walking it in particular ways. These promenades 
were heavily organized, instructing people to look at a series of views designed 
to surprise and delight (de Certeau 1984, 91-110; Mukerji 2012). Such garden 
performances were also a diplomatic activity: the state organized tours to 
impress distinguished foreigners. The goal was to display the French state’s 
cultural and technical power, as well as its geographical and civilizational reach. 
Indeed, many modernizing monarchs in Europe emulated Louis XIV’s model of 
cultural governance by building their own Versailles-like gardens: Peter the 
Great’s Peterhof Palace in St. Petersburg, for example. As a project of the 
gardening state’s social-ordering and world-ordering, Versailles actively worked 
to produce “France” for natives and foreigners alike (Mukerji 1997, 37). 
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Like Louis XIV, China’s Qianlong Emperor (r. 1735-96) had a passion for 
battles and gardens (Keswick 2003, 92; Thomas 2009, 118). He is well-known 
for doubling the territorial expanse of the empire, and for expanding the size of 
the Summer Palace in Beijing, the Garden of Perfect Brilliance (Yuanming 
yuan)—and these two activities are related (Barmé 1996; Broudhehoux 2004, 
46-47). The Qianlong Emperor certainly enjoyed the Garden of Perfect Brilliance 
as a pleasure garden, a place to rest and recuperate after his long military 
campaigns and elaborate imperial tours (Thomas 2009). While it is common to 
see gardens as a refuge from the demands of political life (see McClimens et al. 
2012), the Garden of Perfect Brilliance was an imperial site that, like Versailles, 
was a diplomatic space. While Louis XIV engaged in Westphalian interstate 
diplomacy at Versailles, the Garden of Perfect Brilliance embodied the 
hierarchical diplomacy of tributary relations in the Chinese world order: vassal 
states came to the garden to present tribute to the Son of Heaven. Indeed, this 
tribute from China’s Asian neighbors often included garden-building materials 
such as exotic plants, ornamental stones, and strange beasts (Keswick 2003, 
45, 169; Thomas 2009, 116). European diplomats also met the emperor in the 
garden: when British envoy Lord Macartney went to China in 1793, he first visited 
the Throne Room of the Garden of Perfect Brilliance to offer gifts to the court 
(see Thomas 2009).  
The Garden of Perfect Brilliance was not simply one coherent utopian 
garden; rather, it is better understood as a heterotopic redistribution of the 
sensible that integrated a “massive complex of gardens, villas, government 
buildings, landscapes and vistas, [that] drew on many elements of fantasy, of 
garden and scenic design, of cultural myth and imaginative practice” (Barmé 
1996, 113). This heterotopic garden combined civility and martiality in interesting 
ways: the Qianlong Emperor brought back gardening ideas from both his military 
campaigns and his imperial tours (Broudhehoux 2004, 49-50).  
The Garden of Perfect Brilliance thus functions both as a condensed 
version of the best gardens of the empire, and as the Sinocentric world order’s 
particular distribution of the sensible. The Qianlong Emperor’s main imperial 
residence in the Garden of Perfect Brilliance was the “Garden of the Nine 
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Realms, Clear and Calm” (Thomas 2009, 126), which, according to garden 
historian Wang Yi (2014, 158), was the exemplary imperial garden. In this “peace 
garden” (i.e. “Clear and Calm”), the Emperor could survey the world in 
microcosm, with the mythological integration of the “nine realms” alluding to the 
legendary unification of China—and of the world (Barmé 1996, 117; Broudehoux 
2004, 53; Wang 2014, 158-162). As with Foucault’s (1986, 26) garden 
heterotopia, the Garden of the Nine Realms “is the smallest parcel of the world 
and then it is the totality of the world. … [it is] a sort of happy, universalizing 
heterotopia.” And as at Versailles, military engineers constructed the imperial 
garden as a redistribution of the sensible that reproduced the expanding 
territoriality of the Qing dynasty, as well as the enduring hierarchy of the 
Sinocentric world order.  
The Qianlong Emperor’s gardening practice was much like that in 
Bauman’s (1989, 13) gardening state, which views “the society it rules as an 
object of designing, cultivating and weed-poisoning.” As the Qianlong Emperor 
put it: “When I find pleasure in orchids, I love righteousness; when I see pines 
and bamboo, I think of virtue; when I stand beside limpid brooks, I value honesty; 
when I see weeds, I despise dishonesty” (quoted in Keswick 2003, 191). The 
Qianlong Emperor thus showed his control over nature and society through 
garden-building, much as Louis XIV did at Versailles (Thomas 2009).  
At about the same time that grand imperial gardens were being built in 
China and France, expansive stroll gardens emerged in Japan. After unifying 
war-torn Japan at the beginning of the Edo period (1603-1868), one of the ways 
that the Shogun military leader safeguarded the new order was to require nobles 
to maintain two residences: one in their home province, and another in the 
imperial capital (where their families were held “hostage”). Yet the shogunate 
did more than use centralized military control to create social order.  It employed 
cultural governance as the “sponsor of the imperial imagination” (Kuitert 2002, 
165): elite competition for status and privilege worked largely through nonviolent 
means, including the construction by nobles of elaborate gardens both in the 
provinces and in the capital. By the early nineteenth century, there were more 
than one thousand stroll gardens in the capital alone (Kuitert 2017, 7). 
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Edo stroll gardens worked much like the Garden of Perfect Brilliance: they 
were built to embody ideal social worlds, but in a heterotopic way that typically 
mixed Chinese and Japanese classical references and views. Like in the 
Qianlong Emperor’s heterotopic garden, they functioned as a “theme park” that 
offered a sequence of fantastic scenes, rather than a singular master narrative 
(Keane 1996, xi, 39). Edo stroll gardens thus combined previous Japanese 
garden styles on their expansive landscaped grounds, including tea house 
gardens and temple gardens. The development of Japanese garden styles over 
the past 1,500 years is quite complex (see Keane 1996; Kuitert 2002, 2017); at 
the risk of over-generalization, one can say that temple and tea house gardens 
were developed during periods of military rule for leaders who sought to cultivate 
a civility/martiality dynamic as a means of cultural governance (see Kuitert 2002, 
151-157).  
Because Japan had little international contact in the Edo period, the focus 
of cultural governance in the garden was less on diplomacy, and more on 
constructing and maintaining social order, on the one hand, and fantastic world 
orders, on the other. The large gardens were vibrant social sites for entertaining 
the Shogun, the Emperor, and other elites (Kuitert 2017, 7): much like in France 
and China, people performed the gardens by walking around a central pond on 
a path that that revealed (and concealed) a series of carefully cultivated views. 
Many of these Edo stroll gardens did not survive into Japan’s modern period 
(1868-present); those that did were often transformed into public parks, such as 
Korakuen in Okayama prefecture—an interesting example because it balances 
the civility of a stroll garden with the martiality of a castle, which rises above the 
garden as a borrowed view. 
Back in China, in addition to working as sites of entertainment and 
diplomacy, gardens were also the site of war. Indeed, the Garden of Perfect 
Brilliance was itself a battlefield during the Second Opium War (1856-1860): 
British and French troops looted the palace of its treasures, and then burnt it 
down. The Second Opium War is important because it still plays a central role 
in China’s national identity as a brutal clash of civilizations; or, more to the point, 
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as a prime example of how Chinese civilization—the imperial garden—was 
destroyed by European “barbarians” (see Lee 2009).  
But as Barmé (1996) explains, it is more complicated than that. The war 
had been raging on and off since 1856. In 1860, the British and French sent an 
official delegation to Beijing hoping to negotiate permanent diplomatic 
recognition from China. “After numerous prevarications, bluffs and acts of 
deception” by the Qing court, it imprisoned the thirty-nine members of the 
delegation in the Garden of Perfect Brilliance. They were held hostage, and 
“subsequently tortured. Of their number eighteen died and, when their bodies 
were eventually returned to the Allied forces in October 1860, even the liberal 
use of lime in their coffins could not conceal the fact that they had suffered 
horribly before expiring” (Barmé 1996, 131). 
British and French forces discussed various ways to respond to this 
outrage. One option was to burn the capital city, as new dynasties typically did 
in China (see Ryckmans 2008). Another was to attack the imperial garden rather 
than the city: the looting and torching of the Garden of Perfect Brilliance was 
designed to inflict pain on the court and the Manchu dynasty, rather than on the 
general Chinese public. It was seen not as an act of vengeance, but as an act 
of “justice” that would punish what the Europeans saw as China’s corrupt and 
barbaric regime (Barmé 1996, 132-133; Keswick 2003, 57; Thomas 2009, 27).  
Rather than simply frame it as a military action, we thus can see the attack 
on the garden as a redistribution of the sensible that resisted China’s cultural 
governance. Instead of pure martial barbarism, it is a curious combination of 
civility and martiality. On the one hand, the garden was built to embody the 
Sinocentric hierarchy’s particular distribution of the sensible. Much like the 
cultural governance of promenades at Versailles, diplomats in Beijing were 
obliged to recognize China’s hierarchical worldview as they performed the 
imperial garden on official visits. On the other hand, the looting and burning of 
the garden was a political performance, a violent redistribution of the sensible 
that was figured as an act of resistance to the Sinocentric world order. It was a 
key event in the redistribution of the sensible that asserted an alternative 
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“standard of civilization”: the Westphalian system of the liberal world order (see 
Gong 1984; Ringmar 2013).  
Indeed, the Garden of Perfect Brilliance continues to function as a 
powerful site of cultural governance: this major educational tourist destination 
works to exemplify both China’s sophisticated civilization and the barbarism of 
Western imperialism (see Lee 2009).  But that does not exhaust its impact either 
in terms of meaning or affect: in the twenty-first century, Beijing’s Old Summer 
Palace has been rebuilt as an historical theme-park where people create their 
own meanings through the active interpretive practice of walking the grounds in 
unpredictable ways (Barmé 1996; Lee 2009; Rancière 2009; Callahan 2010). 
The Garden of Perfect Brilliance is thus a heterotopic distribution of the sensible 
that continues to combine civility and martiality in  complex ways: it is both a 
palace and prison, a site of diplomacy and torture, peace and war, civilization 
and barbarism, cultural governance—and resistance. 
France and China have recruited gardens into public diplomacy as an 
expression of cultural governance for the performance of both domestic and 
foreign policy. Likewise, dissensus in gardens is neither new nor rare. During 
China’s Yuan and Ming dynasties (1271-1644 CE), for example, gardens 
actually flourished as a mode of resistance. Scholar-officials turned to garden-
building after they resigned in protest at what they saw as “immoral 
government”—or when they were fired. While imperial gardens such as the 
Garden of Perfect Brilliance engage in cultural governance, private literati 
gardens offer a redistribution of the sensible as sites of alternative orders, places 
where marginalized scholar-officials could control things in their own utopia 
(Murck and Fong 1980-1981, 1-9; Clunas 1996, 51-52; Keswick 2003, 121, 117, 
123; Henderson 2013, 12-13; Wang 2014). This was not simply a private protest 
against official oppression: China’s literati gardens characteristically were open 
to visits from elites on tour, and from peasants during festivals. The best example 
is the aptly-named Artless Administrator’s Garden, which is the largest and one 
of the most popular in Suzhou, the garden capital of China (Clunas 1996, 22-59; 
Keswick 2003; Henderson 2013, 33-42).  
 
Draft copy: please don’t quote without permission 17 
 
Gardens of Peace, War and Civility/Martiality 
 
The previous section’s discussion of examples from France, China and Japan 
demonstrated how gardens are part of a long and complex international history 
of social-ordering and world-ordering (see Go and Lawson 2017). Its focus on 
the historicity and sociality of gardens as sites of diplomacy, war and peace can 
help us to analyze the aesthetic politics of our two controversial examples—the 
Yasukuni Shrine and the Nanjing Massacre Memorial. While they are typically 
understood as modern memorial sites, this section will show how the Nanjing 
Massacre Memorial and the Yasukuni Shrine were actually designed as 
gardens, and are often experienced as gardens (see Qi 1999; Mashima 2008; 
Precinct Map n.d.). While earlier sections used historical analysis to develop the 
analytical framework, this section will explore the aesthetics of garden-building 
itself as a set of practices that can provoke cultural governance and resistance. 
The aim is to see how the memorials not only convey facts and figures, but also 
to show how they use garden-building conventions to produce political meaning 
and political affect—and not necessarily the meanings and feelings that we’ve 
come to expect.  
Therefore, to understand these memorials as distributions of the sensible 
that creatively combine civility and martiality in political ways, it is helpful to 
survey the aesthetic regime, that is, the conventions, of Chinese and Japanese 
garden-building (see Yoon 1994; Sakuteiki 2001; Ji 2004; Kuitert 2012, 2017; 
Henderson 2013). As the Chinese gardening manual Yuan Ye (1631 CE) tells 
us, “[t]here are no fixed rules in garden creation; it all depends on what the 
landscape lends” (Kuitert 2015, 35; Ji 2004, 257;). Hence a garden is judged by 
how it combines five elements—rocks, water, architecture, plants and poetry—
according to the aesthetic conventions of irregularity, asymmetry, variety, and 
rusticity (Yoon 1994; Hall and Ames 1998; Keswick 2003; Ji 2004). Unlike 
French formal gardens that remake the environment, Chinese garden designers 
often defer to the site to take advantage of the environment’s natural contours 
and borrowed views. Certainly, they still shape the site: according to Yuan Ye, 
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gardening is the process of “digging ponds and piling rocks for mountains” (Ji 
2004, 56). This underlines the need to construct an aesthetic balance between 
rocks and water, which is seen as a symbolic balance between magical 
mountains and sacred lakes. This aesthetic balance is not simply of natural 
elements, but also integrates aspects of high culture: Chinese gardens 
characteristically contain poetic inscriptions and architectural follies (Ji 2004, 76-
103; Henderson 2013, 21-29). 
Rather than the precise geometry of French formal gardens, Chinese and 
Japanese gardens thrive on the aesthetic experience of irregularity: a common 
feature is the zig-zag bridge that questions the rational desire to go from here to 
there (see Yoon 1994). Walls are another important feature; but rather than 
perform as absolute barriers, they work to both conceal and reveal (Hall and 
Ames 1998, 175-178; Keswick 2003, 138, 146-148; Ji 2004, 179-193). As 
master gardener Shen Fu (1763-1808 CE) explains, Chinese garden-building 
employs the heterotopic art of deception: “showing the large in the small and the 
small in the large, providing for the real in the unreal world and for the unreal in 
the real” (cited in Wang 1998, 34). Like the civility/martiality dynamic, garden-
building is a contingent social construction, a heavily-designed distribution of the 
visible, hearable, smellable, and feelable, and thus of the sayable, the thinkable 
and the doable. 
Japanese gardens grew out of Chinese gardens, which were introduced 
from Korea in the sixth century CE (Yoon 1994, 447; Keane 1996, 10). While 
Chinese gardens employ five elements, Japanese gardens generally look to 
three elements: water, stones, and plants (Yoon 1994; Keane 1996, 38). But, 
once again, the dynamic of the garden lies in the way it is designed, rather than 
in its design elements. Japan’s medieval gardening classic, the Sakuteiki 
(2001,151), opens with the declaration that gardening is “the art of setting 
stones.” It values the harmonic interplay between two-dimensional planes 
(ponds, raked sand, walls, and fences) and three-dimensional volumes 
(especially rocks and clipped plants) (Keane 1996, 16-18, 137; Hall and Ames 
1998, 180-181). There is always a tension between awe at nature’s wildness, 
and the need for human control (see Luke 2000; Sakuteiki 2001, 151, 191-192; 
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Burrell and Dale 2002), which is very similar to the civility-martiality dynamic. 
Gardens in both China and Japan thus don’t focus on flowers; they are more 
conceptual, as an interplay of style and content which conveys feelings in a 
(re)distribution of the sensible. Again: the best question is not “what is the 
garden,” but rather “how does the garden work” as an aesthetic experience and 
mode of cultural governance? 
 
Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall 
 
The Nanjing Massacre Memorial is the most popular museum in China. It 
commemorates the victims of atrocities committed by the imperial Japanese 
army when it invaded the Chinese capital in 1937 (The Memorial Hall n.d.; 
Denton 2014, 133-152). The Massacre Memorial is thus the closest thing China 
has to an official war memorial: indeed, in 2014 Chinese President Xi Jinping 
went there to declare China’s first “National Memorial Day” (Xinhua 2014). It 
sees over five million visitors per year, primarily students on school trips but also 
an increasing number of domestic tourists. Over the May Day holiday in 2011, 
for example, it was packed with families, as well as a few young dating couples.  
The Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall is an award-winning series of 
structures. The Memorial Hall’s main exhibit is in a “tomb-like” underground 
history museum that commemorates the victims of wartime atrocities by 
graphically telling the horrific story of rape, murder, looting, and destruction. 
While the museum works to nail down the meaning of the memorial as singular 
and dystopic—militarist Japan attacking civilized China—the overall style of the 
memorial space is more of a heterotopic distribution of the sensible. It was 
designed by top architect Qi Kang (1999, 12), who felt his mission was to 
express the “social and national feelings” of the Nanjing massacre by 
“embodying the historical disaster in the entire design of the environment.” To 
do this, Qi (1999, 16, 124-125) mixed the design styles of socialist realism, 
classical Chinese gardens, and Japanese public architecture. His task was to 
generate an atmosphere using landscape gardening techniques “to give 
visitors a true representation of what happened in history. In a word, buildings, 
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grounds, walls, trees, slopes and sculptures were essential elements not to be 
neglected” (Qi 1999, 13). The Memorial has been built in four phases to 
commemorate the fortieth and seventieth anniversaries of the end of World 
War II, and the sixtieth and seventieth anniversaries of the Nanjing Massacre. 
It thus is a heterotopic site that contains many different gardens, and this 
article will focus on two of them. 
 
FIG. 1: Disaster in Jinling, Nanjing Massacre Memorial 
 The “Disaster in Jinling [Nanjing]” public sculpture opened in 1997 as part 
of phase two (see Figure 1); since its organizing themes are “pain” and “hatred,” 
it focuses sharply on what is seen as China’s unfinished historical business with 
Japan (Qi 1999, 16). This monumental sculpture shows a scene of violence and 
tragedy, where Chinese people suffered during Japan’s invasion of Nanjing, 
which resulted in a huge death toll and the destruction of one third of the city’s 
buildings. The site includes a massive decapitated man’s screaming head, the 
frantically outstretched arm of a buried-alive victim, and a city wall that has been 
mutilated by artillery fire. Qi’s (1999, 17) aim here is for the memorial sculpture 
to be “resonant with the wails and shrieks of the dead.” 
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FIG. 2: Disaster in Jinling 
But on second glance, the Disaster in Jinling also employs many classical 
Chinese garden-building conventions (see Figure 2). As Qi (1999, 16) explains, 
“[i]n design, Chinese gardens came to mind, which is a sort of concentration of 
nature, with mountains and pavilions put in a limited ensemble.” When viewed 
from this oblique angle, different meanings emerge (see Rancière 2009, 111ff; 
Whitehall and Ishiwata 2012). The memorial has the familiar mix of water, rocks, 
and architecture, and there is a harmonic dynamic between the water-like gravel 
in the front, and the mountain-like wall in the rear. The sculptures of a 
dismembered head and a clawing arm resemble a Chinese garden’s ornamental 
stones. The bullet-ridden city wall, inscribed with the official number of victims—
300,000 dead—is much like a garden’s symbolic mountain range inscribed with 
poetry. Lastly, the curved bridge (another garden convention) takes visitors over 
a river of gravel to a different place, which has vibrant pine trees that symbolize 
virtue and eternal life (see Keswick 2003, 191; Henderson 2013). Hence, 
“Disaster in Jinling” is not simply a memorial, it is a Chinese garden. 
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FIG. 3: Peace Tower 
The second example is “Peace Square,” which opened in 2007 to mark 
the seventieth anniversary of the Nanjing massacre.  It has a long reflecting pool 
at the center on an East-West axis, a landscaped garden to the South, and a 
bas-relief wall to the North. The focus of Peace Square is on “Peace Tower” at 
the West end of the reflecting pool; the tower integrates three “peace symbols” 
into one sculpture: a woman who both carries a child and releases a dove (see 
Figure 3). Rather than a Chinese garden, Peace Square is a more generic, 
modern garden-park. Still, it uses some Chinese aesthetic conventions to 
conceal and reveal the view (Keswick 2003, 28, 37): to enter the garden, you 
have to first pass through a very dark commemoration hall before coming out 
into the bright light that reveals the beautiful scene of the reflecting pool with the 
Peace Tower at the end. 
But what kind of “peace” is presented in this garden? China’s military 
victory over Japan is displayed by the bugling soldier, whose boot stands on a 
Japanese helmet and sword (see Figure 4). As the sculpture shows, this garden 
embodies a particular civility/martiality dynamic: peace through strength. Behind 
the bugler is a large bas-relief “Wall of Victory” that records how the communist 
party heroically led the Chinese people to employ military force to triumph over 
Japan. Peace here is seen as the result not of mutual understanding, but of 
military strength.  
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                                        FIG. 4: Peace through Strength 
While Qi Kang’s goal is to foster peace and promote reconciliation through 
garden-style landscape architecture, the memorial’s particular distribution of 
the sensible works to produce feelings of fear, outrage, and hate. Peace here 
is not tied to nonviolence or reconciliation, but to overwhelming military force 
and vengeance. This peace/war dynamic was underlined in 2002 when a plan 
to rename the massacre memorial as the “Nanjing International Peace Center” 
generated outrage among the Chinese public. After 80% of Nanjing residents 
opposed the plan, it was dropped (Huang 2002). In 2015, the Memorial opened 
an annex dedicated to a new exhibit “Three Victories: The Victory of the Anti-
Fascist War in the China Theater and Judging the Historical Truth of Japan’s 
War Crimes” (The Memorial Hall n.d.). Hence, in China, the cultural 
governance of anti-Japanese historiography and militarized peace is 
hegemonic, allowing only limited space for resistance (see Callahan 2015).  
Even so, there are opportunities for people to performatively experience the 
garden in ways that resist state-led cultural governance. Teenagers on a date 
are likely to be engaging in their own redistribution of the sensible. Back at Peace 
Square, resistance emerges through an unintentional use of a Chinese garden-
building convention. Behind the Peace Tower is an impious “borrowed view” 
(see Kuitert 2015): the sacred patriotism of the site is violated by the (capitalist) 
profanity of the billboard for Jinsheng International Property (see Figure 3).  
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Yasukuni Shrine 
 
Like most national war memorials, the Yasukuni Shrine in central Tokyo 
commemorates the sacrifice of people who died for their country (see Edkins 
2003, 57-110). All fallen soldiers’ souls are enshrined at this Shinto temple that 
is sponsored by the Japanese emperor (see Figure 5). It is also a controversial 
place because in 1978 the souls of fourteen “Class A” war criminals and 5,700 
“Class B and C” war criminals were secretly enshrined (Kingston 2007; 
Takenaka 2015). Hence, as the Chinese ambassador’s intervention described 
above shows, there was outrage when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited the 
Yasukuni Shrine in 2013.  
 
      FIG. 5: Yasukuni Shrine, Tokyo 
To many in East Asia, the Yasukuni Shrine is not a utopian site for 
national heroes, but a dystopian site that celebrates wartime atrocities. Abe’s 
visit thus provoked a general concern about the return of Japanese militarism, 
and was seen as part of his reinterpretation of Japan’s Peace Constitution to 
expand the role of the military (Thorsten 2016). The Yusukan Museum, which is 
on the grounds of the Shrine and guides mainstream understandings of this 
memorial, shows that there is cause for concern. The museum’s tour of 
Japanese history, with its scenes of war, death, and martial commemoration, 
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glorifies Japan as both a heroic warrior nation and as an unrepentant victim (see 
Record in Pictures 2009). The Yusukan Museum thus embodies a distribution of 
the sensible that serves to police the meaning of the Yasukuni Shrine and of the 
Japanese nation according to a stable linear narrative of patriotic coherence and 
unity (see Edkins 2003; Whitehall and Ishiwata 2012). 
But there is more to the Yasukuni Shrine than the Yusukan Museum; in 
many ways, the Shrine is an Edo stroll garden that juxtaposes different elements 
and styles (see Mashima 2008). To enter, you can pass through Japan’s largest 
shrine gate, and promenade up the central path through landscaped gardens 
complete with statuary, stone lanterns, religious out-buildings, and market stalls. 
After passing through another gate, you enter into the “Inner Garden,” a temple 
garden that is dominated by Yasukuni’s Main Shrine, and also contains other 
temple and tea house gardens: behind the Shrine is the Sacred Pond Garden 
that includes three tea house gardens (see Precinct Map n.d.).  
Hence, when recognized as a heterotopic garden park that combines 
civility and martiality, the Yasukuni Shrine complex can accommodate meanings 
and feelings that resist the militarism of the Yushukan Museum. To put it another 
way, there is more than one way to experience the Shrine. Most people outside 
Tokyo only see the Shrine when it is a site of key national events, especially the 
militarist and pacifist demonstrations sparked by the visits of leading politicians. 
But for people who live and work in the neighborhood, the Shrine has different 
meanings that are not exhausted by the war-peace binary opposition. While it is 
a sacred imperial shrine, it is also a space of everyday life. People crisscross it 
as part of their everyday activities, creating different meanings as they walk (see 
de Certeau 1984, 91-110; Enloe 2011). Much like Louis XIV’s Versailles, the 
Shrine is a space of performative cultural governance. But unlike Versailles, it is 
also a site of resistance to both militarism and its opposite, pacifism. It is a sacred 
space and a hypernationalist site; but it is also a short cut, a place for a smoke, 
or to eat your lunch on a sunny day (see Whitehall and Ishiwata 2012; Figure 6). 
Unlike the Nanjing Massacre Memorial, which is mostly contained behind high 
walls, the Yasukuni Shrine, like many urban peace gardens, is a crossroads for 
pedestrian traffic at the heart of the city (see McClimens et al. 2012, 122). 
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“Walking in Tokyo, Yasukuni Shrine” is a fascinating Youtube video that 
records the experience of simply walking through the Shrine, and thus 
performing this Japanese stroll garden via an impious itinerary (Egawauemon 
2008). The video was a response to a film made of the hypernationalist crowds 
that gathered in 2006 to cheer on Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi’s 
controversial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine on August 15, the day that Japan 
marks the end of World War II. It aims to show how the Yasukuni Shrine has 
meanings beyond hypernationalism and militarism. The video starts off outside 
the Shrine grounds in the midst of a political demonstration complete with 
banners, activists with loudspeakers, and helicopters circulating overhead. It 
offers the perspective of an ordinary visitor, walking in the front gate and up the 
main pedestrianized avenue of the Yasukuni Shrine, performing it as an Edo 
stroll garden. It is fascinating to see—and hear—the experience evolve from 
partisan politics to the politics of everyday life. The people walking the site shift 
from activists outside the gate to a human assemblage on the Shrine grounds: 
salarymen, students, families, tourists, and shoppers all out for a stroll. The 
sound of the loudspeakers and helicopters is gradually overwhelmed by the 
screech of crickets, the murmur of private conversation, and music from the 
temple. Surely, some people are going to the Yusukan Museum, but that is not 
the focus of this film. Others pause to experience the sacred space, while yet 
another set of people traverse the site as a crossroads between here and there. 
In this way, meaning is actively constructed in perambulative performances 
worthy of de Certeau’s (1984, 91-114) practice of everyday life and Rancière’s 
(2009) emancipated spectator (also see Enloe 2011). 
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FIG. 6: Yasukuni Stroll Garden 
This film thus encourages us to change the question from “what is the 
meaning of the Yasukuni Shrine,” to “when” and “where” is the meaning of the 
Shrine? If we find the film’s perambulative performance meaningful, then we can 
appreciate the Yasukuni Shrine as an Edo stroll garden which performatively 
resists the state-led cultural governance that frames politics in terms of war vs. 
peace. Rather than allow the Yusukan Museum to determine the meaning of the 
experience, we can look to the Sacred Pond Garden at the back of the Shrine to 
reframe our understanding of it as a site of life, reflection, and other possibilities 
(see Figure 6). Hence to redistribute the sensible and thereby resist cultural 
governance, it is not necessary to burn down China’s imperial garden as the 
Anglo-French forces did in 1860. People can resist state-led cultural governance 
simply by experiencing the garden as a heterotopia that redistributes the 
sensible dynamic of civility and martiality in performances that not only counter 
militarism, but also resist the war-peace framing of global politics. 
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Conclusion 
 
This article has explored the contingent social workings of key gardens to make 
two main arguments: first, gardens are “unexpected spaces” for the global 
politics of social-ordering and world-ordering which, in turn, impact issues of 
diplomacy, war and peace; and second, to understand the global politics of 
gardens, it is necessary to take an aesthetic approach to IR that appreciates 
gardens as heterotopic (re)distributions of the sensible that can embody new 
performances of cultural governance and resistance. Specifically, it questioned 
how we categorize the Nanjing Massacre Memorial and the Yasukuni Shrine as 
“peace gardens” or “war gardens” to explore how they function as distributions 
of the sensible that embody particular civility/martiality dynamics. As we saw, 
such (re)distributions of the sensible, in turn, can generate cultural governance 
and resistance.  
Rather than performing a simple reversal to see the Nanjing Massacre 
Memorial as a war garden and the Yasukuni Shrine as a peace garden, this 
analysis aimed to loosen up such binary distinctions to better appreciate the 
creative play in the civility/martiality dynamic (see Rancière 2004, 48-49). Such 
oblique interventions underline how war memorials, gardens and other 
unexpected spaces of IR are not stable containers of meaning, but need to be 
actively (re)interpreted as performances of cultural governance and resistance. 
As noted above, what is most interesting about the civility/martiality dynamic is 
its lack of a stable canonic definition: there is no orthodoxy, and its contingent 
flexibility demands that we make sense of global politics through continual 
interpretive practice. 
This article addresses East Asian international politics because that is the 
author’s particular area of expertise. But as the example of Versailles shows, 
this research deploys unexpected juxtapositions to call into question any 
Orientalist regionalization of international studies. Indeed, the hope is that this 
article will generate further studies of the global politics of gardens that explore 
examples from other times and places. For example, what can we make of the 
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National September 11 Museum and Memorial in New York, which embodies a 
particular civility/martiality dynamic in its heterotopic distribution of the sensible? 
On the one hand, its official museum seems to follow the distribution of the 
sensible seen at the Nanjing Massacre Memorial. Both provoke raw emotions 
through their intimate connection to death: the Massacre Memorial is built on the 
site of a mass grave, and thousands of people died a violent death at Ground 
Zero. Both underground museums seek to stabilize the meaning of the tragedy 
(and the identity of the nation) by assigning the roles of villains and victims in a 
tragically heroic narrative (see Blais and Rasic 2015).  
On the other hand, rather than be walled-off like the Nanjing Massacre 
Memorial, the above-ground 9/11 Memorial is open like the Yasukuni Shrine. As 
a hub in New York’s transportation system, it is even more of a crossroads that 
people traverse going from here to there in everyday life, as well as on particular 
pilgrimages. Michael Arad’s “Reflecting Absence” memorial is also radically 
open: twin voids that controversially reproduce the gaping wound in the 
cityscape as a pair of black holes. As in the Japanese stroll garden, this water 
garden is open to multiple interpretations as a site of life, death, and rebirth (see 
Denson 2011; Blais and Rasic 2015; Sturken 2016).  
As this exploratory discussion suggests, the 9/11 Memorial is ripe for 
further analysis; it can be profitably analyzed as a garden heterotopia that 
redistributes the sensible dynamic of civility and martiality in performances of 
cultural governance and resistance. Garden-building here is theory-building: by 
producing new sites and sensibilities of global politics, it creatively shapes our 
understanding of IR. 
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